Constitutional Law - Fourth Amendment - Search and Seizure - Standing - Co-Conspirator Exception by Ginocchi, James M.
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 32 Number 4 Article 11 
1994 
Constitutional Law - Fourth Amendment - Search and Seizure - 
Standing - Co-Conspirator Exception 
James M. Ginocchi 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
James M. Ginocchi, Constitutional Law - Fourth Amendment - Search and Seizure - Standing - Co-
Conspirator Exception, 32 Duq. L. Rev. 897 (1994). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol32/iss4/11 
This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOURTH AMENDMENT-SEARCH AND
SEIZURE-STANDING--CO-CONSPIRATOR EXCEPTION-The United
States Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment contains
no co-conspirator exception and maintained that the proper deter-
mination is whether each respondent had either a property interest
or a reasonable expectation of privacy which was invaded by the
search and seizure.
United States v. Padilla, 113 S. Ct. 1936 (1993).
On September 26, 1989, Officer Russel Fifer of the Arizona De-
partment of Public Safety was patrolling on Interstate Highway 10
near Casa Grande, Arizona, when a Cadillac passed him.1 The Cad-
illac was moving at a high rate of speed, then slowed as it passed
the officer's car.2 The Cadillac continued to slow down, and ulti-
mately Officer Fifer pulled the car over to the side of the highway
for going too slowly.3
Luis Arciniega ("Arciniega") was the driver and sole occupant of
the car.4 On request, he furnished Fifer with a driver's license in
his own name and also an insurance card in the name of Donald
Simpson. Officer Robert Williamson arrived to aid Officer Fifer
and together they asked to search the Cadillac.6 Arciniega con-
sented to the search of the vehicle.' The officers opened the trunk
and discovered 560 pounds of cocaine inside the compartment.8
After his arrest, Arciniega cooperated with the authorities and
agreed to make a mock delivery of the cocaine.' From his motel
room in Tempe, Arizona, Arciniega called Jorge and Maria Pa-
l. Brief for the United States at 5, United States v. Padilla, 113 S. Ct. 1936 (1993)
(No. 92-207) [hereinafter Brief].
2. United States v. Padilla, 113 S. Ct. 1936, 1937 (1993). The driver appeared to he
acting suspiciously, so the officer followed the car for several miles. Padilla, 113 S. Ct. at
1937.
3. Id. Due to a miscommunication, the police radio dispatcher informed Officer Fifer
that the license plates on the Cadillac were registered to a different make of car. Brief at 5.
4. Padilla, 113 S. Ct. at 1937.
5. Id. The officers called in Simpson's card and discovered he was a United States
Customs Agent. Id.
6. Id. Both officers thought Arciniega matched a "drug courier profile." Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Padilla, 113 S. Ct. at 1937. This was done in order to identify other possible
participants of the illegal project. Id.
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dilla.'0 Shortly thereafter, Jorge and Maria Padilla came to the
motel and were arrested when they tried to drive away in the Cad-
illac." In similar fashion, the police convinced Maria Padilla to
help them find the remainder of the drug-smuggling group.' 2 Ms.
Padilla directed the authorities to a house where her husband,
Xavier Padilla, was staying."s
After all the suspects were arrested, the police learned that the
Cadillac, filled with the illegal drugs, belonged to Donald Simp-
son."' Subsequent investigation showed that Donald Simpson's
wife, Maria Sylvia Simpson, was also involved in the operation. 8
Arciniega, Jorge, Maria, and Xavier Padilla, Donald and Maria
Simpson, and Warren Strubbe ("Respondents") were charged with
violating two federal conspiracy statutes.'6 Prior to trial, Respon-
dents moved to suppress all of the evidence found during the in-
vestigation. 7  The district court agreed with the challenge
presented by all Respondents that because they were operating a
joint venture, Respondents were responsible for the control of the
contraband.'8 Upholding Respondents' challenge, the court de-





14. Padilla, 113 S. Ct. at 1937.
15. Id. The search found evidence to indicate Warren Strubbe was linked to Xavier
Padilla. Id. at n.1. Strubbe did not appeal the court of appeals ruling that he did not have
standing to challenge the search, therefore the Supreme Court did not address his challenge
to the search. Id.
16. Id. at 1937-38. All Respondents were charged with violating The Drug Abuse Pre-
vention and Control Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1) (1988). Id. at 1938. These statutes
prohibit conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine, and posses-
sion of cocaine with intent to distribute respectively. Id. Xavier Padilla was also charged
with the violation of a third statute, The Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act. Id. That
statute reads in pertinent part: "Any person who engages in a continuing criminal enterprise
shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment .... " 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) (1988 & Supp. III
1992). As noted, the Supreme Court did not address Warren Strubbe's convictions. See note
15.
17. Padilla, 113 S. Ct. at 1938. Respondents argued that any evidence found subse-
quent to the stop should necessarily be suppressed because the search of Arciniega's vehicle
violated their Fourth Amendment rights. Id. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
18. Padilla, 113 S. Ct. at 1938. The Court stated that this fact led to the conclusion
that all Respondents were responsible for control of the illegal drugs. Id.
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served. 19 The district court decided that Xavier Padilla, Maria Pa-
dilla, and Jorge Padilla were entitled to challenge the stop based
solely on the joint venture aspect of the case. 20 At the conclusion of
the suppression hearing, the court held that the search of
Arciniega's car and all evidence obtained from the search should
have been suppressed because Officer Fifer had no reason to stop
Arciniega.21
The court of appeals affirmed the suppression order as to Re-
spondents Xavier Padilla, Donald Simpson, and Maria Simpson; it
remanded for further findings with respect to Jorge and Maria Pa-
dilla; and it reversed as to Respondent Warren Strubbe.22 In find-
ing that the Simpsons and Xavier Padilla were entitled to chal-
lenge the stop of Arciniega, the court relied on a line of Ninth
Circuit cases holding that leaders or supervisors of a joint criminal
venture enjoy a legitimate privacy interest in the persons or places
involved in the conspiracy by virtue of their role in the joint ven-
ture.2- Using the co-conspirator exception, the court of appeals
then assessed the role of each Respondent in the venture to deter-
mine whether he or she exercised sufficient ownership and control
over the operation to give any of them standing to challenge the
stop.
24
The court concluded that the Simpsons and Xavier Padilla had
standing, not simply because the Simpsons owned the car and
jointly possessed the' drugs with Xavier Padilla, but also because
they participated in the organization of the operation, particularly
on the day of the stop.26 The court also held that Donald Simpson
had standing by virtue of his position as a customs agent.2 Be-
19. Id.
20. Id. The Supreme Court stated, "[tihe district court reasoned that, as owners, the
Simpsons retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in their car, but that the Padillas
could contest the stop solely because of their supervisory roles and their 'joint control over a
very sophisticated operation.' " Id. (citation omitted).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Padilla, 113 S. Ct. at 1938. The court of appeals maintained that in order "[t]o
contest the legality of a search and seizure, the defendants must establish that they had a
'legitimate expectation of privacy' in the place searched or the property seized." Id. (citing
United States v. Padilla, 960 F.2d 854, 858-59 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 1936 (1993)).
24. Id. At this point the court of appeals stated its co-conspirator exception: "[A] co-
conspirator's participation in an operation or arrangement that indicates joint control and
supervision of the place searched establishes standing." Id. (citing United States v. Padilla,
960 F.2d at 859).
25. PadiUa, 113 S. Ct. at 1938.
26. Id. The court inferred that because of Donald Simpson's status as a customs
agent, his role in the transportation of the drugs between the United States and Mexico was
1994 899
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cause Maria Simpson was the go-between, playing the role of plan-
ner and supervisor of the drug project, the court concluded she
also had standing.2 7 Lastly, the court determined that Xavier Pa-
dilla's privacy expectation arose out of his connection in purchas-
ing the drugs and his delivery of the illegal substance throughout
the state.
28
On appeal, the Supreme Court asserted that traditional interpre-
tation of the Fourth Amendment2 9 consistently demonstrated that
defendants were not entitled to seek suppression of evidence seized
as a result of the violation of a third party's rights.3 In this case,
however, the Ninth Circuit held that Respondents could obtain
suppression of the cocaine Arciniega was transporting, as well as
other evidence developed in the course of the investigation under
the Ninth Circuit's "co-conspirator exception" to the traditional
rules of Fourth Amendment standing.3 1 The Supreme Court noted
that this "co-conspirator exception" conflicts with the rules in
other circuits,3 2 and therefore, the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari to resolve this conflict.
33
In the opinion, the Court emphasized that a defendant may not
seek suppression of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment unless he or she was a victim of the illegal search or
seizure. 4 The Supreme Court decided that membership in a joint
venture to deliver drugs should not give co-conspirators a privacy
or property interest or right.3 5 Therefore, the Supreme Court held
imperative and thus Donald Simpson had standing. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. As noted earlier, the Court remanded for further findings on the role of Jorge
and Maria Padilla in the conspiracy. Id. The record was not clear as to whether the Padillas
shared any responsibility for the project or just worked for the Simpsons. Id.
29. Id. at 1939. Fourth Amendment search and seizure claims are governed by expec-
tations of privacy and property interests. Id.
30. Padilla, 113 S. Ct. at 1939 (citations omitted).
31. Id. at 1938 (citing United States v. Padilla, 960 F.2d at 859-61).
32. Padilla, 113 S. Ct. at 1939. The Court noted that "[t]he First, Second, Fifth,
Sixth, Eighth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits have declined to adopt an excep-
tion for co-conspirators or codefendants." Id. at n.3 (citations omitted).
33. United States v. Padilla, 113 S. Ct. 404 (1992).
34. PadiUa, 113 S. Ct. at 1939. The Court cited Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S.
165, 171-72 (1969), which outlined the defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment
holding that there is no standing for those who are aggrieved solely by the introduction of
the evidence. Alderman, 394 U.S. at 171-72. In Alderman, the Court decided that third
parties to a conspiracy may not suppress evidence that may incriminate them unless the
search and seizure of the evidence violated their intimate privacy interests. Id. at 173. See
notes 92-99 and accompanying text for full discussion of the Alderman case.
35. Padilla, 113 S. Ct. at 1939. The Court found that the co-conspirator exception
used by the Ninth Circuit offended both the holding in Alderman and the established prin-
900 Vol. 32:897
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that the decision of the court of appeals allowing Respondents to
challenge both the evidence found in the investigatory stop of one
of the members of the conspiracy, as well as the subsequent search
of the car he was driving, should be reversed. 6
The Fourth Amendment37 was created in response to specific
grievances against British colonial abuse. 8 These complaints re-
lated to the issuance of Writs of Assistance which permitted un-
restricted searches of colonists' homes and possessions.39 Such
writs were usually employed to permit searches of persons sus-
pected of smuggling, tax evasion, or anti-British political activity.
40
Across the Atlantic, a similar search and seizure tactic was being
practiced where general warrants were being issued against print-
ers, publishers, and others opposing tax laws or government poli-
cies."1 In 1765, Lord Camden, in Entick v. Carrington,"2 relied
upon traditional concepts of common law property rights to award
damages in trespass against royal officers who broke into a home to
execute a general warrant.43
Just as Entick relied in its holding on property concepts, the
United States also attempted a similar solution in its Constitu-
tion.44 Boyd v. United States45 became the model for the property
rights view of the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court in
Boyd considered whether a statute which required an individual to
produce certain records and books for government inspection vio-
lated the Constitution. 6 Because the defendant's property was be-
ciple that privacy and property interests govern search and seizure claims. Id. Only if a
respondent's rights were violated by the search itself may a respondent claim suppression of
evidence under the Fourth Amendment. Id.
36. Id. The Court remanded the case so that the Ninth Circuit could consider
"whether each respondent had either a property interest protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment that was interfered with by the stop of the automobile driven by Arciniega, or a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy that was invaded by the search thereof." Id.
37. See note 17 for full text of the Fourth Amendment.
38. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583-84 n.21 (1980) (stating that the crux of
the Fourth Amendment provides that a defendant may retreat into his own home and,
there, be free from unreasonable government intrusion of his property or person).
39. Payton, 445 U.S. at 584 n.21.
40. Id.
41. Entick v. Carrington, 2 Wils. K.B. 275 (1763).
42. 2 Wils. K.B. at 275.
43. Entick, 2 Wils. K.B. at 276. Once the Bench established the plaintiff's superior
right to the property, the trespass was established and the agents were liable. Id. at 292.
The Bench reasoned that property interests were the interests affected. Id.
44. See note 17 for the full text of the Fourth Amendment.
45. 116 U.S. 616 (1886), overruled by Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
46. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 633. Boyd did not involve an actual seizure, but rather involved
an order to turn over certain papers. Id. The Supreme Court held this to be the equivalent
1994
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ing seized for the purpose of using that property against the de-
fendant at trial, the Court reasoned that the attempted seizure was
the equivalent of forcing Boyd to testify against himself.4 7 The
Boyd Court firmly established the principle that the Fourth
Amendment can only be invoked by a defendant when that de-
fendant has a specific proprietary right in the goods seized."s With-
out possession of the goods, the evidence could be used against the
defendant and the seizure would be constitutional."9
The first Supreme Court case authorizing suppression of illegally
seized evidence in a criminal case was Weeks v. United States.5 0 In
this case, involving the unlawful use of the mails, the Court ques-
tioned whether the government should return illegally seized evi-
dence to the defendant. 5' The rationale for such an order was that
since the government seized the property through an illegal tres-
pass, the defendant's proprietary right to that evidence was supe-
rior to that of the government.5 2 Weeks also made the same dis-
tinction as Boyd, holding that the Fourth Amendment would not
apply to search and seizure of stolen property because the defend-
ant would lack a lawful property interest in such goods. 3
The requirement of a property right for assertion of the Fourth
Amendment right was formalized and refined in Hester v. United
States6 ' and Olmstead v. United States.5 In Hester, federal
agents watched as the defendant was handling bottles of what ap-
peared to be illegal moonshine in an open field surrounding de-
fendant's house.5" The issue before the Court was whether the
agents violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights during
the investigational surveillance of an illegal moonshining operation
in the area surrounding the defendant's home. 7 The agents pro-
of a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. Id. at 634.
47. Id. at 633.
48. Id. at 624.
49. Id. at 633.
50. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
51. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 390-92. The letters were taken from the defendant's home by
the government, and the defendant put in a timely application to retrieve the letters and
private documents seized in his house in his absence. Id. at 393.
52. Id. at 389.
53. Id. at 391-92. In its conclusion, the Weeks Court established the exclusionary rule
to require evidence obtained in violation of an individual's Fourth Amendment rights be
suppressed. Id. at 397.
54. 265 U.S. 57 (1924), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
55. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).




ceeded to traverse onto defendant's land without a warrant and
seized the bottles." By reasoning that the fields surrounding the
defendant's home were not a "private place," the Court established
that not only was the defendant required to have a proprietary
right in the area searched, but that the area itself had to be a pri-
vate place for the Fourth Amendment protections to apply.59 The
Supreme Court concluded that the trespass on the defendant's
land did not result in a Fourth Amendment violation.6
Olmstead not only reiterated the "private place" standard of
Hester, but further established a requirement that an actual physi-
cal intrusion into the "private place" was necessary before Fourth
Amendment rights could be asserted.6 In Olmstead, the defend-
ants were charged with a conspiracy to import and sell liquor un-
lawfully.62 This information was largely obtained by federal agents
intercepting messages on the telephones of conspirators. 3 The
question was whether the phone tapping used to discover the ac-
tivity was admissible as evidence, or whether it encroached on the
defendants' Fourth Amendment rights.64 The Court ruled that evi-
dence received under long distance surveillance was admissible and
did not impair upon Fourth Amendment rights.6 5 The Court rea-
soned that property law was conclusive as to both the substantive
issues of Fourth Amendment rights and the question of who was
entitled to assert those rights. 6
While the property rights view of the Fourth Amendment was
adequate for the Nineteenth Century, new technological advances
in electronics, photography and wiretapping made actual physical
trespass outdated as a means of conducting searches. Justice Bran-
deis discussed this facet of the Fourth Amendment in his dissent
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 58-59.
61. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466. The Court indicated that wiretapping, electronic bug-
ging, and long distance surveillance were not within the scope of the Fourth Amendment.
Id.
62. Id. at 455.
63. Id. at 464.
64. Id. at 457.
65. Id. at 466. The Court reiterated that prior decisions had held that a defendant's
Fourth Amendment right had only been violated when a specific property interest was in-
volved. Id.
66. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466. The defendant's privacy interest in being personally
free from unreasonable searches and seizures was never considered by the courts. Moreover,
the concept of standing had not yet been applied in a Fourth Amendment context. See
Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114, 121 (1942). See note 74 for a discussion of
Goldstein.
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in Olmstead.7 Justice Brandeis stressed that the wiretaps and
other electronic devices introduced in Olmstead showed the fu-
turistic trend toward a non-physical surveillance for which the
property rights view of the Fourth Amendment was wholly
inadequate.6 8
Jones v. United States69 provided the first major step from a
property law view of the Fourth Amendment to recognition of an
individual, constitutional right to privacy.70 The Court granted
Fourth Amendment protection to any persons legitimately on the
premises during a search.7 1 The Court shifted the focus from the
property seized to the individual rights of the person claiming
Fourth Amendment protection .7  A significant effect of the Jones
shift of Fourth Amendment emphasis to personal privacy was the
introduction of the concept of Fourth Amendment standing.7
With the addition of the standing requirement, Jones established a
two-step inquiry for deciding Fourth Amendment actions4.7  First,
the Court focused upon the legal status of the individual against
whom the evidence was being used.75 The next step was to deter-
67. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis' view of the Fourth Amend-
ment as protecting privacy rights was rejected by the majority in Olmstead, and was not
formally accepted until Katz was decided almost 40 years later. See notes 78-85 and accom-
panying text for the decision of the Katz case.
69. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
70. Jones, 362 U.S. at 257-59. This case involved a search of an apartment pursuant to
a warrant. Id. at 259. At the time the warrant was executed, the defendant was present as a.
visitor. Id. The police found heroin in a bird's nest outside a window and charged the de-
fendant with possession of the drugs. Id. At trial, the defendant moved to suppress the
evidence. Id. at 258-59.
71. * Id. at 266-67.
72. Id.
73. Standing has traditionally dealt not with the merits of a constitutional claim, but
with the personal qualifications of a specific person to that claim. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83, 99-101 (1968). In federal criminal cases, issues of standing to raise a Fourth Amendment
claim were decided in the context of Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which stated: "[a] person aggrieved by an unlawful search or seizure may move the district
court ... for the return of the property on the ground that he is entitled to lawful posses-
sion of the property which was illegally seized." FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e).
74. Jones, 362 U.S. at 265-67. While standing to assert Fourth Amendment claims had
been mentioned as early as 1942 in Goldstein v. United States, the sole question then was
the defendant's right to property searched or seized. Goldstein, 316 U.S. 114, 121 (1942).
However, when the Fourth Amendment was based on property rather than privacy con-
cerns, the concept of standing, which is an inquiry into a party's personal qualifications, was
meaningless. Goldstein, 316 U.S. at 120. A claim did not even exist for persons without a
property right. Id. For those who did not have such a right, the property interest was dis-
positive of the claim. Id. Hence, there was no distinction between standing to assert a
Fourth Amendment claim and the substantive merits of such a claim. Id. at 120-22.
75. Jones, 362 U.S. at .266. The Court reasoned if the defendant was legitimately on
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mine if the officers acted with probable cause in carrying out the
search. 6 By removing property law limitations on Fourth Amend-
ment standing, the Supreme Court was able to deduce that the
possibility of a conviction for criminal possession in and of itself
made the defendant a person aggrieved by the search and seizure
which produced the evidence."
The Supreme Court in Katz v. United States,78 established a
personal right of privacy flowing from the Fourth Amendment.7 9 In
Katz, the defendant had been convicted of violating a statute pro-
scribing interstate transmission by wire communication of bets and
wagers.80 The issue in Katz was whether the defendant, who had
been subject to warrantless electronic eavesdropping while in a
public telephone booth, could properly be regarded as the victim of
a search."1 The Court ruled that the government's activities in
electronically listening to and recording defendant's words spoken
into a telephone receiver in a public telephone booth violated the
privacy interest that the defendant expected during his use of the
phone booth.8 2 The Court explained that Fourth Amendment pro-
the premises at the time of the search, he had standing to challenge the search. Id.
76. Id. at 269-70. Thus the Court established an automatic standing rule whereby any
defendant charged with possession of an item would automatically be granted standing to
move to suppress that item. Id.
77. Id. at 263. The automatic standing rule did not decide the merits of any Fourth
Amendment claims, but merely held that where possession will convict, it will also confer
standing to suppress. Id. At first, the Court was reluctant to switch to the privacy interest
that Jones established. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961), where the
Court recognized the right of privacy in a case dealing with electronic eavesdropping, but
still based its decision on the existence of a property right. Silverman, 365 U.S. at 510-11.
Finally, the Court abandoned the property-based view of the Fourth Amendment and fo-
cused upon the privacy interest involved. See Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294 (1967). In that case, the Court stated:
The premise that property interests control the right of the Government to search
and seize has been discredited. Searches and seizures may be unreasonable within the
Fourth Amendment even though the Government asserts a superior property interest
at common law. We have recognized that the principal object of the Fourth Amend-
ment is the protection of privacy rather than property and have increasingly dis-
carded fictional and procedural barriers rested on property concepts.
Warden, 387 U.S. at 304.
78. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
79. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. The Court recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects
people and their interests, not places. Id. The Court stated that, "[wihat a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection ...[b]ut what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected. Id. at 351 (citations omitted).
80. Id. at 349-50.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 351-52. This constituted a search and seizure within the scope of the Fourth
Amendment. Id.
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tection extends beyond property lines to areas in which one has a-
reasonable expectation of freedom from government intrusion. 3
Since the bugging of the phone booth "violated the privacy upon
which the defendant justifiably relied," the Court found the depri-
vation of a Fourth Amendment interest, notwithstanding defend-
ant's lack of a proprietary interest in the telephone booth.84 Thus,
Katz firmly established a personal right of privacy flowing from
the Fourth Amendment. 5
The privacy expectation doctrine of Katz was extended to the
standing issue in Mancusi v. DeForte.8 6 Defendant, a union official
who shared an office with other employees, attempted to suppress
papers seized during a search of the office.87 The Court questioned
whether the papers seized could be admissible as evidence or
should be suppressed because they were the personal property of
the defendant.8 The Court reasoned that defendant's office was a
place in which the defendant had a legitimate expectation of free-
dom from illegal search and seizures.8 9 Upon finding that the de-
fendant had an established interest in the documents and the of-
fice, the Court reasoned that the defendant had a privacy interest
that must be protected by the Fourth Amendment. ° The Court
determined that defendant's expectation of privacy was similar to
that of the defendant in Jones, and was therefore sufficient to ac-
cord him standing, despite the fact that he neither owned the
seized papers nor had title to the searched premises.9
The 1969 decision of Alderman v. United States92 constituted
the Supreme Court's most extensive discussion to date of the gen-
eral standing requirement for the exclusionary rule, and dealt in
particular with the question of third party standing. Alderman was
a multi-defendant case in which all defendants moved to suppress
tapes of telephone conversations.9 3 Unlike Katz, Alderman dealt
83. Id. at 350.
84. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352-53.
85. Id.
86. 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
87. Mancusi, 392 U.S. at 365.
88. Id. at 366.
89. Id. at 368-69.
90. Id. at 368-69.
91. Id. at 367-70. Justice Black, dissenting, contended that the logical extension of the
Court's holding would do away with standing entirely. Id. at 376 (Black, J., dissenting).
92. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
93. Alderman, 394 U.S. at 167. The conversations had been made by some of the ac-
cused in a store belonging to another defendant. Id. at 167-68.
Vol. 32:897906
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specifically with the question of standing. 94 The issue the Court
faced involved the admissibility against one defendant of evidence
obtained from an illegal wiretap of another defendant's conversa-
tion. 5 In the Court's opinion, each individual's privacy rights al-
lowed standing to those defendants who were actual participants in
the conversations. 6 The co-conspirators argued that the evidence
against them should be suppressed because the evidence was ille-
gally obtained as to one of the conspirators and therefore, inadmis-
sible against all.91 The Court rejected this theory based on the
principle that only the defendant whose rights have been violated
during the search for evidence has a claim to suppress under the
Fourth Amendment. 8 The Court concluded by stating that a de-
fendant aggrieved by the introduction of damaging evidence se-
cured by an illegal search and seizure of a third person's premises
or property has not had any of his or her Fourth Amendment
rights infringed upon.9
The decision in Rakas v. Illinois'" reflected the Court's dissatis-
faction with both the theoretical foundation and practical implica-
tions of the existing law of standing.101 In Rakas, the defendants
moved to suppress evidence obtained in an illegal search and
seizure based on the automatic standing rule."0 2 The Court consid-
ered whether the defendants had a legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy in property placed in the glove compartment of the car, if
they were not the owners of the car. 103 The Supreme Court af-
94. Id. Petitioners were convicted of conspiring to transmit murderous threats over
the telephone and through interstate commerce. Id. These phone calls were made from Al
Alderisio's store. Id. Alderisio wanted the evidence suppressed as to his involvement because
he contended that he was not involved in the calls under question. Id. at 174.
95. Id. at 175.
96. Id. at 177-78. The owner of the store was therefore allowed to raise a Fourth
Amendment claim solely by virtue of his property right. Id. Standing was denied to all other
defendants against whom the tapes were being introduced as evidence. Id. at 178.
97. Alderman, 394 U.S. at 171-72.
98. Id. at 172 n.5. The Court determined that only a victim of the search has stand-
ing and that only one whose privacy has been invaded can properly call himself a victim of
the search. Id. at 174-75.
99. Id. at 174.
100. 439 U.S. 128 (1978), reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 1122 (1979).
101. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 130. In Rakas, police stopped a car in which the defendants
were passengers, suspecting that the car might have been used in a recent robbery. Id. The
police searched the interior of the car and found a sawed-off rifle under the front passenger
seat and a box of rifle shells in the locked glove compartment. Id. Neither of the defendants
claimed ownership of either the automobile, the rifle, or the shells. Id. at 130 n.1.
102. Id. at 132-33.
103. Id. at 148.
1994
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firmed the lower court decision that the defendants lacked stand-
ing to object to the search and seizure, but the Court based its
holding on the interests in the Fourth Amendment, not stand-
ing.10 4 The Rakas opinion determined that the concept of standing
served no useful purpose in the Fourth Amendment context be-
cause standing was "invariably intertwined" with substantive
Fourth Amendment law.' 0 5 The Court reasoned that neither de-
fendant claimed a property or possessory interest in the automo-
bile or the items seized.' 06 The Court concluded that neither de-
fendant enjoyed a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched
car, and thus neither party had the interest necessary to contest
the legality of the search and seizure.' °7
The Supreme Court's abandonment of treating the standing rule
as a separate issue from substantive Fourth Amendment privacy
and property claims was solidified in United States v. Salvucci.108
The defendants in Salvucci were indicted for possession of stolen
mail.0 9 The issue the Court considered was whether the defend-
ants were entitled to automatic standing to suppress the evi-
dence."0 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the automatic
standing rule of Jones had outlived its usefulness and was there-
fore overruled."' The Court rationalized that the question was not
merely whether the defendants had a possessory interest in the
items seized, but also whether the defendants had an expectation
of privacy in the area searched and whether the expectation had
been violated."2 By overturning the automatic standing rule, the
Court rejected the contention that possession of the seized prop-
104. Id. at 140. The Court stated that, "we think that definition of those rights is more
properly placed within the purview of substantive Fourth Amendment law than within that
of standing." Id.
105. Id. at 138-40.
106. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148. The Court stated that since the Fourth Amendment pro-
tects areas or items in which individuals have established a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy, the question then becomes whether the defendants have such an interest in the area
searched. Id. at 143-44.
107. Id. at 148-50.
108. 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
109. Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 85. The charges were predicated upon 12 stolen checks
seized by police during the search of an apartment leased to a defendant's mother. Id. In
upholding the motion to suppress, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that the auto-
matic standing rule was the sole basis for allowing these defendants to assert'a Fourth
Amendment claim. United States v. Salvucci, 599 F.2d 1094, 1097 (1st Cir. 1979), rev'd, 448
U.S. 83 (1980).
110. Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 86.
111. Id. at 95.
112. Id. at 91-92.
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erty is enough to establish automatic standing under the Fourth
Amendment.' 13 In conclusion, the Court defined personal Fourth
Amendment rights in terms of proprietary and privacy interests."1'
In the same year, the Court decided Rawlings v. Kentucky,"" a
case in which a defendant was accused of possessing drugs that
were seized from his girlfriend's purse.' Thus, like Rakas and
Salvucci, Rawlings involved a guilty defendant and questionable
police action which could lead to suppression of the drugs and dis-
missal of the indictment."' The Court had to determine whether a
proprietary interest in the area searched was needed to decide if
the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy." 8 The
Court in Rawlings began its analysis by quoting with approval the
language in Katz and Rakas, that the trial court should determine
whether the defendant had a legitimate privacy interest in the area
searched. 1 9 The Court reasoned that ownership of the seized prop-
erty alone, without more, was not sufficient to vest the defendant
with Fourth Amendment protection. 20 Given that the defendant
had not established a specific proprietary right in the area
searched, his girlfriend's purse, the Court concluded that the de-
fendant was not protected under the Fourth Amendment.' 2'
The Supreme Court had expressly refused to extend Fourth
Amendment standing to parties other than the immediate victim
of the illegal search and seizure.' 22 The Court's determination to
apply this principle strictly was reflected in its 1980 decision in
United States v. Payner."2 In Payner, an Internal Revenue Ser-
vice agent made an illegal seizure of a briefcase belonging to an
officer of a Bahamian bank, and copied numerous documents con-
113. Id. at 90-91.
114. Id. at 83.
115. 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
116. Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 100. The defendant was present at the time of the search
and seizure and admitted to ownership of the drugs. Id. at 100-02.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 103-04.
119. Id. at 104.
120. Id. at 105. Rawlings thereby explained the Court's ability to decide Fourth
Amendment issues based upon privacy rights by permitting a selective use of property law.
Id. The Court added that ownership of the property will not necessarily confer the right to
challenge the search and seizure, but rather serves merely as a factor to be considered in
determining a party's expectation of privacy in the relevant area. Id.
121. Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 104-05.
122. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 132-38; Alderman, 394 U.S. at 174-75. See also notes 92-
107 and accompanying text.




tained therein.1 24 Information obtained from the documents ille-
gally seized by the Internal Revenue Service agent led to an indict-
ment and prosecution of defendant, a customer of the bank, on tax
evasion charges.12 5 The question considered by the Court was
whether the defendant's Fourth Amendment privacy rights were
violated by the seizure of the documents.126 Although the lower
courts found that no Fourth Amendment rights of the defendant
were violated by the illegal seizure, the evidence was excluded at
trial. 1 27 The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' decisions,
ruling that the defendant had no expectation of privacy in the
seized documents and thus was unable to show the violation of a
Fourth Amendment right. 2 ' The Court reasoned that the defend-
ant could not assert vicarious standing to challenge evidence ob-
tained through illegal conduct by agents of the United States be-
cause the defendant did not satisfy the standing requirement of
the Fourth Amendment. 29 Further reasoning by the Court showed
that defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were violated only
when the challenged conduct invaded his legitimate expectation of
privacy rather than that of a third party. 30 In sum, the Court al-
lowed the evidence to be admitted on the ground that it was not
protected by the Fourth Amendment.3 1
In 1992, the Court made it clear that interest in property is just
as important as the privacy interest when dealing with Fourth
Amendment claims. In Soldal v. Cook County, Illinois,3 ' a mobile
home owner brought a suit against his landlord and police officers
for attempting to disconnect and move petitioner's mobile home
from the trailer park.1 3 The Court fielded the question of whether
124. Payner, 447 U.S. at 730.
125. Id. at 729-30.
126. Id. at 731.
127. Id. at 730-31. The Court determined that the government's knowing, willful, and
bad-faith violation of the bank officer's constitutional rights required the exclusion of the
evidence by virtue of the inherent supervisory powers of the federal courts. Id.
128. Id. at 732 n.4.
129. Payner, 447 U.S. at 733-36. The Court thus rejected the dissent's contention that
the federal courts should not sanction the deliberate and intentional violation of the law of
search and seizure by the government, despite the inability of a particular defendant to
challenge the action. Id. at 736 n.8.
130. Id. at 735.
131. Id.
132. 113 S. Ct. 538 (1992).
133. Soldal, 113 S. Ct. at 542-43. The petitioner claimed that his Fourth Amendment
rights were violated because he had a significant property interest in the mobile home. Id. at
543. The respondents argued that although the petitioner did have a property interest, no
invasion of privacy was implicated, and therefore the petitioner had no standing. Id. at 542.
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the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable seizures of
property when no privacy interest was present. 134 The Court ruled
that seizure of property occurs when there is some meaningful in-
terference with an individual's possessory interest in that prop-
erty.135 The fact that the petitioner owned and lived in the trailer
was enough to establish standing and a viable property interest.136
The Court reasoned that an unlawful seizure, even in the absence
of a privacy issue, can still invade a proprietary interest. 3 Thus,
the Court revived the notion that Fourth Amendment search and
seizure issues are governed by both property and privacy interests.
The decision from the court of appeals in Padilla upholding the
co-conspirator exception squarely contradicts the Supreme Court's
position on the Fourth Amendment. 38 The Ninth Circuit's ap-
proach is irreconcilable with the settled principle that Fourth
Amendment violations are personal, and that only those whose
rights have been violated by a search and seizure may seek sup--
pression of evidence obtained as a result of that violation. 39
The Court has established the fundamental principle that a de-
fendant's Fourth Amendment rights are violated only when the
challenged conduct invades the defendant's legitimate expectation
of privacy rather than that of a third party. 4 ' That principle fol-
lows from the general rule that Fourth Amendment rights are per-
sonal rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may not
be vicariously asserted.""
By focusing on each Respondent's role in the drug smuggling
scheme rather than whether each Respondent was the victim of an
illegal seizure, the court of appeals committed a fundamental er-
ror. 42 Under settled Fourth Amendment principles, a defendant's
status as a co-conspirator, no matter how significant his or her role
in the conspiracy, is irrelevant to the question of whether the de-
fendant's Fourth Amendment rights have been violated. 43 Only a
134. Id. at 541.
135. Id. at 545.
136. Id. at 545-47.
137. Id. at 545.
138. Padilla, 113 S. Ct. at 1936-37.
139. Id. at 1937-38.
140. Payner, 447 U.S. at 731.
141. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 133-34 (quoting Alderman, 394 U.S. at 174). In short, in order
to obtain suppression, a person must be a victim of a search or seizure rather than one who
claims a violation based on the search of another. Alderman, 394 U.S. at 173.
142. Padilla, 113 S. Ct. at 1938-39.
143. Id. at 1939.
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person whose privacy and/or property interests are affected by a
seizure may contest its lawfulness. 14 4 An individual's Fourth
Amendment interests are not affected by a seizure simply because
a co-conspirator has been arrested or the contraband that is the
subject of the smuggling conspiracy has been seized.145
In the instant case, the Respondents' status as co-conspirators
cannot create an expectation of privacy where one otherwise would
not exist. The fact that a respondent acts in league with others to
accomplish the ends of a joint venture has no bearing on the basic
Fourth Amendment question-whether law enforcement officials
violated the respondent's rights to be free from unreasonable
seizures of the respondent's person, property, or premises.
14 6
No circuit other than the Ninth Circuit has accepted the notion
that a person's role in a joint venture can give rise to a legitimate
Fourth Amendment interest in a search and seizure affecting other
members of the conspiracy. 14 7 In addition to being inconsistent
with prior decisions of the Supreme Court and other circuit courts,
the Ninth Circuit's recognition of joint venture standing can dra-
matically increase the cost of suppressing evidence in conspiracy
cases. Because a single conspirator was unlawfully stopped, the
court below had suppressed virtually all of the evidence against the
leaders of the enterprise, including a corrupt law enforcement offi-
cial, and had effectively terminated their prosecutions on serious
drug trafficking charges.1 4 8 This occurred despite that fact that Re-
spondents were not the persons seized in the highway stop.
1 49
Whatever the additional benefits of extending the exclusionary
rule to co-conspirators may be, they do not justify such a further
encroachment upon the public interest in prosecuting those ac-
cused of crime and having them acquitted or convicted on the ba-
sis of all the evidence which exposes the truth.
Not only did the Ninth Circuit's doctrine impose great costs on
the criminal justice system, it did so in a particularly perverse
fashion. To challenge the unlawful search or seizure of a co-con-
spirator, defendants in the Ninth Circuit must demonstrate that
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. The Court adopted the decision made in Alderman that "[cloconspirators and
codefendants have been accorded no special standing" under the Fourth Amendment. Id.
(quoting Alderman, 394 U.S. at 171-72).





they had a leadership or central role in the conspiracy. The most
culpable participant in such an operation, like Xavier Padilla or
the Simpsons, may therefore be effectively immunized from prose-
cution, while a relatively minor figure, such as Jorge Padilla, is left
to face the full brunt of the government's evidence.1 50 This doc-
trine thus has the anomalous result of rewarding conspirators for
assuming a leading role in the conspiracy! To permit respondents
to suppress evidence based on a challenged stop is an unsupported
and unsound rule that serves only to confer a Fourth Amendment
windfall on defendants like Respondents. The Supreme Court in
this case has effectively reaffirmed that the focus on the role of
each respondent in the conspiracy is irrelevant, and that the
proper consideration is one of privacy and property interests that
may have been violated during the investigation.
James M. Ginocchi
150. See notes 5-28 and accompanying text for the roles of the respective Respon-
dents. See also Brief at 5.
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